CORRECTION NOTICE · OCTOBER 2026

# Corrections to the July 2026 edition

Israeli Democratic Infrastructure  Country–Organism Governance Atlas  Nevo Goor

The first version of this report rated Constitutional Integrity as Healthy, on a Freedom House score of 85. Freedom House gives Israel 73 out of 100, in its 2025 edition and again in 2026. That is Free, but in the warning band, so the dimension is now rated **Constrained**, and the count reads **two functioning or healthy, eight constrained, two impaired**.

Three figures changed with it. The RSF 2026 score is 46.46, rank 116 of 180, where the report carried an estimate of about 47. The CPI for 2025 is 62, rank 35 of 182, down two points from 2024, where the report carried about 63 and an upturn. Israel's World Bank Government Effectiveness estimate is 1.26 for 2023 and 1.28 for 2024, where the report carried about 1.0. Israel held five elections between April 2019 and November 2022, not four.

The report also cited a World Justice Project rule-of-law figure. That index does not cover Israel, so the figure is removed and the two dimensions that leaned on it are marked as qualitative reads.

The constitutional-integrity gate stays clear, by three points. The two active hard gates, emergency governance and press freedom, are unchanged.

> **New in this edition.** An addendum at the end compares the institutional indicators in force in the week before 7 October 2023 with the latest published values. The direction is clear. Attribution to the attack is not established.

COUNTRY–ORGANISM GOVERNANCE ATLAS

# Israeli Democratic Infrastructure

## A governance diagnostic ahead of the October 2026 elections

State of Israel | July 2026, corrected October 2026 | Nevo Goor | An independent project by Nevo Goor

FIRST-IN-BATTERY FINDING — TWO HARD GATES ACTIVE

**Israel is the first country in the COGA assessment battery to trigger two simultaneous structural threshold breaches: the emergency governance architecture (a 78-year continuous state of emergency) and press freedom (an RSF 2026 score below the 50-point floor). A functioning-democracy classification is blocked on both grounds independently.**

### Governance classification

## Democracy under sustained constitutional pressure

| HARD GATES ACTIVE | STRESS LEVEL | TRAJECTORY | RESILIENCE READ |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 of 4 | Elevated | Contested | Constrained — election-dependent |

DEFINING STRUCTURAL FEATURE

The Judicial Selection Committee law, passed in March 2025, gives the governing coalition greater control over Supreme Court appointments and is deliberately staged to take effect only after the October 27 election. The election will determine whether the law activates under its architects or is reversed — making it a structural governance trigger, not merely a political contest.

PRIMARY RESILIENCE ASSET

The Supreme Court has struck down two laws designed to reduce its own authority, and the government has complied with both rulings. Anti-corruption proceedings against the sitting Prime Minister have continued uninterrupted. Fiscal management has absorbed the most expensive war in Israel's history while maintaining market confidence.

Assessment period: July 2026 · Government in office: Netanyahu-led coalition (Likud, UTJ, Shas, Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionism) · Framework: COGA Scoring Instrument v1.1 · An independent project by Nevo Goor · Stage 0 — structured analytical opinion · Non-partisan assessment (see Section 8)

> This report applies the Country–Organism Governance Atlas framework to the condition of Israeli democratic governance ahead of the general election of October 27, 2026. It evaluates twelve dimensions of institutional function using established international indicators. It does not predict electoral outcomes; it identifies where the system is functioning, where it is under constraint, and where the election represents a structural governance event rather than a purely political contest.

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SECTION 1 — ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW

# Purpose, Scope, and Structural Flags

This report assesses Israeli democratic governance in July 2026, three months before the October 27 general election. It is the third in a series of country diagnostics published by the Country–Organism Governance Atlas ahead of major 2026 electoral events, following reports on the United States (midterms, November 2026) and Brazil (general elections, October 4, 2026).

**Scope.** The assessment covers only Israel within the Green Line. Gaza and the West Bank are explicitly excluded — conditions there are assessed separately and are not part of this diagnostic, consistent with Freedom House's own methodology. Arab citizens of Israel, roughly 20% of the population, are within scope.

Five structural conditions modify how the standard indicators are interpreted in this case. They are documented here, before the dimensional assessment begins.

> **No written constitution.** Israel operates under Basic Laws that can be amended by a simple Knesset majority. The absence of an entrenched constitutional rights floor is a structural feature that bears directly on the boundary and emergency-architecture dimensions.
>
> **Continuous state of emergency since 1948.** Israel has maintained a formal state of emergency for 78 years, renewed annually by the Knesset. This is the central emergency-architecture finding and directly triggers Hard Gate 3.
>
> **Active armed conflict since October 7, 2023.** As of the assessment date, Israel has been at war for nearly three years. This affects the press-freedom, civil-society, fiscal-capacity, and emergency-architecture readings throughout. Wartime conditions are assessed as the current governance reality, not as a temporary distortion.
>
> **Active criminal proceedings against the sitting Prime Minister.** Netanyahu faces three criminal indictments in an active trial. This is material to the rule-of-law and anti-corruption dimensions.
>
> **Non-partisan commitment.** The framework's founder is an Israeli citizen. The conflict-of-interest gate for this report was explicitly cleared: publication was held until the US diagnostic had established the framework's non-partisan track record. All findings are drawn directly from named international indicators and documented primary sources, and no political inference is made beyond what the evidence supports.

SECTION 2 — STRUCTURAL THRESHOLD ASSESSMENT

# Two Hard Gates Active

Four thresholds define the outer boundary conditions of democratic institutional function. A breach of any one independently blocks a functioning-democracy classification. Israel breaches two — the first country in the COGA assessment battery to do so simultaneously.

| THRESHOLD | INDICATOR | SCORE | BREACH POINT | STATUS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Constitutional Integrity Floor** | Freedom House total | 73 / 100 | <70 = breach | **Clear** |
| **Anti-Corruption Floor** | CPI | 62 / 100 | <40 = breach | **Clear** |
| **Emergency Governance Architecture** | Automatic emergency sunset | None — 78 years continuous | No auto-sunset = breach | **Breached** |
| **Information Environment Floor** | RSF Press Freedom 2026 | 46.46 / 100 | <50 = breach | **Breached** |

The Constitutional Integrity Floor is clear by three points: Freedom House's 73 is above the breach point of 70. The anti-corruption floor is clear by 22 points.

## Gate 1 — Emergency Governance Architecture

Israel has maintained a formal state of emergency since its establishment in 1948 — 78 consecutive years, renewed without exception. Basic Law: The Government §38(b) limits each declaration to one year, but renewals are unlimited in practice. In June 2026 the Knesset extended the emergency by a vote of 29 to 7, with 84 of 120 members absent — a procedural formality rather than genuine deliberation. The emergency authorizes administrative detention without trial, detention without a court mandate, and, critically, the suspension of Supreme Court rulings. A separate state of emergency was declared on February 28, 2026 by the Defense Minister in response to Israeli–US strikes on Iran, and was extended by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee until April 14. This confirms that emergency powers are not merely an inherited, dormant instrument but are actively deployed.

## Gate 2 — Information Environment Floor

Israel's RSF Press Freedom Index score has declined for several consecutive years. The 2025 score of 51.1 placed Israel 112th of 180 countries. The 2026 index put Israel at 46.46, rank 116 of 180, a fall of 4.6 points, which breaches the sub-50 threshold. Within-scope domestic restrictions independently sustain the finding: the Al Jazeera law authorizing the closure of foreign news channels deemed security threats; military-censorship requirements, including prior approval for foreign outlets filming impact zones; political pressure on media appointments by broadcasting regulators; the Communications Minister's call to boycott *Haaretz*; and the Prime Minister's documented refusal, since 2021, to grant interviews to any outlet other than the pro-government Channel 14.

> **Consequence of two active gates.** A healthy or functioning-democracy classification is blocked on two independent structural grounds. Both gates require structural legislative reform to clear; neither is resolvable by a change of government alone. Both have been present for years, and both are worsening rather than stable.

SECTION 3 — DIMENSION SCORECARD

# Twelve Governance Dimensions

Each dimension is classified against its named indicators and given a trajectory. Classifications run from Healthy through Functioning, Constrained, and Impaired.

| # | DIMENSION | CLASSIFICATION | TRAJECTORY | KEY SIGNAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | **Constitutional Integrity** | **Constrained** | Stable | FH 73 (Warning band); no written constitution; V-Dem downgraded to electoral democracy. |
| 2 | **Information Environment** | **Impaired** | Deteriorating | RSF 46.46 (HG-4 active); Al Jazeera law; military censorship; boycott pressure. |
| 3 | **Institutional Signal Accuracy** | **Constrained** (qualitative read; WJP not available) | Deteriorating | Netanyahu trial; judicial-reform pressure on rule of law. WJP: Israel not covered. |
| 4 | **Institutional Constraint Architecture** | **Constrained** (qualitative read; WJP not available) | Deteriorating | Judicial Selection Committee law (passed Mar 2025, activates post-election); Jan 2026 legal-adviser subordination bills. |
| 5 | **Public Service Delivery** | **Constrained** | Deteriorating | War-driven impairment; civil-service politicization legislation advancing. |
| 6 | **Anti-Corruption Effectiveness** | **Functioning** | Stable | CPI 62 (down 2); Netanyahu trial active; incapacitation law struck down as tailor-made legislation. |
| 7 | **Minority and Civil Society Protection** | **Constrained** | Deteriorating | Arab-citizen budget cut $550M; wartime expression crackdown; 252 Arab Israelis murdered in 2025. |
| 8 | **Emergency Governance Architecture** | **Impaired** | Structural | 78-year emergency; 2026 Iran-strike emergency declared unilaterally; HG-3 active. |
| 9 | **Democratic Feedback Quality** | **Constrained** | Deteriorating | Institutional trust low across dimensions; October 7 commission blocked; election competitive. |

| # | DIMENSION | CLASSIFICATION | TRAJECTORY | KEY SIGNAL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 | **Institutional Shock Capacity** | **Healthy — Track B** | Deteriorating | Debt 68.6% of GDP; healthy under the Track B advanced non-reserve-currency threshold; war-driven rise. |
| 11 | **Accountability and Reform Capacity** | **Constrained** | Deteriorating | October 7 commission blocked; legal-adviser subordination advancing; judicial compliance positive. |
| 12 | **Long-Run Governance Sustainability** | **Constrained** | Stable | WEF ~0.73–0.75, rank 76 (+15); ultra-Orthodox structural exclusion; compounded Arab disparities. |

**Summary.** Two dimensions functioning or healthy, eight constrained, two impaired. The two functioning dimensions, anti-corruption and fiscal capacity, are the primary resilience assets, and both operate under a state of emergency.

## Constitutional Integrity (Constrained)

Freedom House scores Israel 73/100 in both its 2025 and 2026 reports and classifies it as Free, in the Warning band (70 to 84). The state generally guarantees political rights and civil liberties for the population within its borders. However, V-Dem has downgraded Israel from liberal democracy to electoral democracy — a categorical classification change consistent with the judicial-independence pressure and civil-liberties deterioration documented across the other dimensions. The absence of a written constitution means the rights floor has no formal entrenchment: Basic Laws can be amended by a simple Knesset majority, a structural vulnerability that the judicial-reform process demonstrated in practice.

## Institutional Constraint Architecture (Constrained, Election-Dependent)

The Supreme Court struck down the reasonableness-clause amendment in January 2024 and, in the same period, the incapacitation law that would have shielded Netanyahu from removal — two landmark rulings the government complied with under protest. In March 2025 the Knesset passed a law changing the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee to increase coalition control over judicial appointments, including to the Supreme Court; the law is deliberately staged to take effect only after the next Knesset election. In January 2026 the governing coalition advanced legislation to subordinate ministerial legal advisers to political directors-general rather than to the independent Attorney General, and to allow appointment of the civil-service commissioner without a competitive professional process. In December 2025, a sitting and a retired Supreme Court president publicly defended judicial independence.

The Judicial Selection Committee law is the single most significant governance finding in this assessment. It has already passed. It will activate, or be reversed, on the strength of the October 27 election result. This is not the risk of a future capture; it is a law already on the books whose effect is election-dependent.

## Anti-Corruption Effectiveness (Functioning)

Israel's CPI score is 62 in 2025 (rank 35 of 182), down 2 points from 2024 and above the 40-point floor. The active criminal trial of a sitting Prime Minister across three cases (gifts from businesspeople, regulatory

favors for media, regulatory favors for telecoms) has continued without political interruption — the strongest single anti-corruption signal in the assessment. In striking down the incapacitation law, the Supreme Court found explicitly that it constituted “tailor-made legislation serving the Prime Minister's immediate personal interests” in relation to his criminal trial — a court-documented conflict-of-interest finding, not an editorial opinion.

### Democratic Feedback Quality (Constrained)

Trust in government institutions is low across all measured dimensions, consistent with Warning territory. The most acute feedback failure is the blocking of a formal state commission of inquiry into the October 7 intelligence and security failure — the deadliest attack in Israel's history. The mechanism for institutional accountability and for learning from that failure has been blocked by the sitting government that bears political responsibility for it. Separately, the 2026 election is genuinely competitive: no single party is dominant, and polling shows Likud at roughly 25–28 seats in a fragmented field. The electoral mechanism itself is functioning as a legitimate accountability instrument.

SECTION 4 — GOVERNANCE STRESS PROFILE

## Leading Indicators Beneath the Formal Indices

ELEVATED — AMBER

### Polarization Velocity

The IDI 2025 documents the deepest political polarization in Israeli democratic history. The judicial-reform battle fused the religious/secular, right/left, and Jewish/Arab cleavages at once. Some 72% of right-wing Jews believe the Supreme Court intervenes too much; large majorities on the left and center take the opposite view. And 58% of Israelis expect attempts to sway the election by domestic or foreign actors.

CONTAINED — GREEN

### Electoral Legitimacy

No major party has engaged in confirmed election denialism. The Central Elections Committee operates independently under Supreme Court oversight, and the election is genuinely competitive. The absence of an October 7 commission is a legitimacy deficit for the incumbent government, not for the electoral mechanism. Hostage-accountability politics function as democratic pressure through normal channels.

ELEVATED — AMBER

### Executive Boundary Testing

Three concurrent legislative tracks target institutional constraints: the incapacitation law (struck down), the Judicial Selection Committee law (passed, staged post-election), and the legal-adviser subordination bill (advancing). The pattern is sustained and directional. Government compliance with court rulings has held, though coalition members have questioned the Supreme Court's authority over Basic Laws.

ELEVATED — AMBER

### Civil Society Stress Absorption

The 2023 judicial-reform protests were the largest in Israeli history, and NGO litigation has successfully challenged government measures. The October 7 accountability movement sustains pressure outside formal channels. Wartime has significantly restricted Arab civil-society expression — documented mass arrests, protest bans, and university disciplinary actions over social-media posts. Jewish civil-society space remains open; Arab civil-society space is materially restricted.

> **Overall governance stress level: Elevated.** Three of four indicators sit at Amber, with Green on electoral legitimacy only and no Red indicators. The stress is institutional and legislative, concentrated in the executive-boundary-testing and polarization dimensions.

SECTION 5 — GOVERNANCE DIAGNOSIS

# Clinical Assessment

Israel approaches its October 2026 election as a democracy in a different kind of trouble from the other cases this framework has assessed this year. It is not deteriorating across the board, as the United States is, nor recovering from an acute rupture, as Brazil is. It is sustaining a targeted structural campaign against the specific institutional elements that have so far kept its governance within democratic bounds — conducted through ordinary parliamentary procedure, by a government that has, when necessary, complied with the very court rulings it is simultaneously working to make impossible.

Two hard gates are active — the first time in the COGA battery that two thresholds have been breached at once. The 1948 state of emergency has been continuously renewed for 78 years without exception, authorizing administrative detention, detention without trial, and the legal suspension of Supreme Court rulings. Press freedom, as measured by the most comprehensive international indicator, has fallen below the framework's threshold for the first time in Israeli history — driven by documented domestic legislative and administrative actions within the scope boundary.

Against these structural failures, two dimensions are genuinely functioning, and the court has held under pressure. The Supreme Court has struck down two pieces of legislation designed to reduce its own authority and has ruled against the government on the Prime Minister's criminal-trial protections; the government complied with both. Anti-corruption proceedings against a sitting Prime Minister have continued for years without political interruption. And fiscal management has absorbed the most expensive war in Israel's history while maintaining market confidence and staying well within the framework's Warning threshold.

The reform agenda that defines this government's governance profile is not extraconstitutional. It advances in increments, through parliamentary process. The problem lies in its cumulative direction and its specific targets: the judiciary that enforces the rights floor, the legal advisers who constrain unlawful executive action, the civil-service appointments that preserve professional independence. Each measure can be defended on its own; together they amount to a sequential reduction of the institutional checks that have so far prevented capture.

The October 27 election is, in this sense, a structural governance event. The Judicial Selection Committee law has already passed and is already staged to activate only after the vote. A returning coalition would implement a law granting it control over future Supreme Court appointments; an opposition coalition could repeal it before it takes effect. This is the most constitutionally consequential governance variable attached to any election in the COGA battery to date.

SECTION 6 — EMERGING THREAT AND RESILIENCE

# Threat and Resilience Read

## 6.1 Emerging Threat Read

MONITORING — MULTIPLE CONCENTRATION PATTERNS PARTIALLY PRESENT

**Constitutional self-entrenchment (partially confirmed).** The incapacitation law was designed to prevent Netanyahu's removal from office on the basis of his criminal trial. The Supreme Court struck it down as tailor-made legislation serving the Prime Minister's personal interests — court-documented confirmation of the pattern. It is not at full firing threshold, because the court prevented completion and the government complied.

**Judicial-appointment capture (advancing).** The Judicial Selection Committee law gives the governing coalition greater control over Supreme Court appointments. It has passed and activates post-election. If the current coalition returns and the law takes effect, the pattern moves toward a confirmed clause-(b) firing threshold for the next assessment period.

**Administrative capture (advancing).** The legal-adviser subordination and civil-service commissioner appointment bills are in active legislative progress. If enacted, internal executive legal constraints would be redirected to political appointees. Because they are not yet enacted, firing cannot be confirmed.

INSURRECTIONARY THREAT — NOT CONFIRMED

The primary governance threat in Israel is legislative and institutional, not insurrectionary. Protests have been civil; electoral legitimacy is not under official attack; there is no confirmed non-compliance with court rulings and no mobilization of street force for extraconstitutional ends. The insurrectionary pattern is not present in the current scoring period, and the Hidden Stress Ledger registers no Red indicators.

## 6.2 Resilience Read: Constrained — Election-Dependent Class

WHAT IS FUNCTIONING AND TESTED

**Supreme Court independence.** Two landmark rulings against the government's core legislative agenda, both complied with. The court remains the primary active institutional constraint; its independence is under pressure but demonstrated.

**Anti-corruption proceedings.** The criminal trial of the sitting Prime Minister has continued for years without political interruption. The prosecution mechanism functions independent of the defendant's political position.

**Fiscal management.** Israel absorbed a war that pushed the deficit to 6.8% of GDP at its peak and raised debt from 60% to 68.6%, while maintaining market confidence, investment-grade ratings, and record international bond issuance — a genuine demonstration of institutional capacity.

**Electoral mechanism.** Five elections between April 2019 and November 2022, all results accepted; genuine competition; a Central Elections Committee under Supreme Court oversight and no captured electoral authority.

THE ELECTION-DEPENDENT STRUCTURAL VARIABLE

**The Judicial Selection Committee law has already passed. The October 27 election determines whether it activates under its architects or is repealed by a new government. This is not a prediction of outcomes but a documented structural fact: no other election in the COGA battery has had a pre-passed law governing judicial-appointment architecture that activates or does not on the basis of the result. It is the framework's primary resilience-classification basis for Israel — the classification is contingent on the election outcome in a specific, documented, structural way.**

PRIMARY RESILIENCE THREATS

**Judicial-appointment architecture.** If the Judicial Selection Committee law takes effect, future Supreme Court composition will increasingly reflect coalition preferences. The court that has been the primary constraint on the reform agenda would, over time, be shaped by the actors whose agenda it has constrained.

**Legal-adviser subordination.** If enacted, the internal executive legal-constraint function is redirected from the independent Attorney General to political directors-general, removing a key check within the bureaucracy itself.

**October 7 commission absence.** Blocking institutional accountability for the most catastrophic intelligence and security failure in Israel's modern history is a repair-capacity failure with long-term consequences for institutional learning and trust.

## 6.3 Reclassification Conditions

UPGRADE — TOWARD CONSTRAINED DEMOCRACY WITH ACTIVE REPAIR

- Judicial Selection Committee law repealed before activation, restoring the existing balanced appointment process.
- RSF press-freedom score returns above 50 across two consecutive assessments, resolving the HG-4 breach.
- A formal state commission of inquiry into October 7 is established, restoring the primary institutional accountability mechanism.
- Emergency architecture reformed — a meaningful sunset or automatic-review mechanism enacted for the 1948 continuous emergency.

DOWNGRADE — TOWARD GOVERNANCE SYSTEM UNDER STRUCTURAL CAPTURE

- Judicial Selection Committee law takes effect under the current coalition, beginning politically aligned Supreme Court appointment.
- Legal-adviser subordination bill enacted, redirecting internal executive legal constraints to political appointees.
- Freedom House score falls below 70 (currently 73), triggering the constitutional-integrity gate.
- Government issues a formal declaration of non-compliance with a Supreme Court ruling.
- October 7 commission established but designed to insulate the current government from accountability rather than produce genuine institutional learning.

SECTION 7 — PEER CONTEXT AND HISTORICAL TRAJECTORY

# Comparative Positioning

## 7.1 Comparative Positioning

On constitutional integrity, Freedom House's 73/100 places Israel in the Free category but in the Warning band. V-Dem's downgrade to electoral democracy aligns Israel with countries experiencing measurable democratic stress rather than with the consolidated liberal democracies it previously resembled.

Across all three July 2026 COGA diagnostics, Israel is the only case with two simultaneous hard-gate breaches. The US has one (emergency architecture) and Brazil has one (anti-corruption); Israel has both emergency architecture and press freedom. It is also the only case in which a pre-passed law governing judicial-appointment architecture activates or does not on the basis of the election outcome — a structural feature with no equivalent in the US midterm or Brazilian general-election assessments.

The Netanyahu criminal trial — three cases, years of proceedings, uninterrupted by the defendant's political position — is, on the COGA battery's evidence, the strongest sustained anti-corruption accountability signal of any current case, and a genuine demonstration of institutional capacity unique to the Israeli case.

## 7.2 Historical Trajectory

Freedom House scored Israel 74 in its 2024 edition and 73 in both the 2025 and 2026 editions. The V-Dem downgrade to electoral democracy in recent years is the first categorical regime-classification change. RSF press freedom has declined from the high 70s to 46.46 over a decade of continuous descent. CPI was 64 in 2024 and 62 in 2025. The World Bank's rule-of-law estimate for Israel fell from 0.91 in 2019 to 0.64 in 2024; the WJP Rule of Law Index does not cover Israel. The 2023–2026 judicial-reform saga is the most concentrated governance-trajectory change in that window — not a gradual decline but an acute, targeted legislative challenge to a previously stable institutional architecture.

SECTION 8 — METHODOLOGY AND DISCLOSURE

# Framework, Non-Partisan Commitment, and Limits

## 8.1 Framework and Non-Partisan Commitment

This report applies the Country–Organism Governance Atlas, a structured governance framework that evaluates twelve dimensions of democratic function using established international indicators. All classifications are traceable to named indicators, documented sources, and explicit threshold values. Primary sources: Freedom House *Freedom in the World* 2025 and 2026; V-Dem Institute *Annual Democracy Report 2025*; Transparency International CPI 2025; RSF World Press Freedom Index 2025 and 2026; World Bank WGI; IMF Article IV 2026; WEF Global Gender Gap Index 2025; Israeli Democracy Institute 2025 Annual Report; Lawfare Media, the Center for Israel Education, and the Times of Israel for legislative documentation; and Minority Rights Group for data on Arab citizens. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index does not cover Israel (2023, 2024 and 2025 editions as read) and is not used.

**Non-partisan commitment.** The framework's founder is an Israeli citizen. The conflict-of-interest gate for this report was explicitly cleared: publication was held pending release of the US diagnostic and at least one external engagement signal, establishing the framework's non-partisan track record across other cases first. Every finding is derived from named international indicators or documented primary sources. The framework assesses institutional function, not political preference. Both the functioning elements of Israeli democracy (the judiciary, anti-corruption proceedings, fiscal management) and its structural failures (emergency architecture, press-freedom deterioration) are reported with equal directness, because both are derived from the same evidence base through the same methodology.

## 8.2 Stage 0 Disclosure

> **Important.** This assessment is produced by a governance framework currently at Stage 0 of its validation protocol. Stage 0 means the framework has been calibrated across ten reference cases and produces internally consistent classifications, but has not yet been formally tested against out-of-sample cases by independent analysts, validated against historical governance trajectories, or subjected to prospective tracking. The classifications here represent structured, evidence-based assessments grounded in established governance indicators; they should be treated as structured analytical opinions, not validated predictive assessments. No claim is made regarding accuracy, sensitivity, specificity, or predictive value. This report supplements but does not replace country-specific expert analysis, legal due diligence, or investment-grade political-risk assessment. It is the first Israel assessment in the framework's battery and carries no prior calibration baseline for the country.

## 8.3 Data Vintage and Scope Boundary

Freedom House scores for Israel are 73 in both the 2025 and 2026 editions. The RSF 2026 score is the published 46.46 (rank 116 of 180), and the CPI 2025 score is the published 62 (rank 35 of 182); all three were read at the publishers on 6 October 2026. Government Effectiveness (WGI) is 1.26 for 2023 and 1.28 for 2024. The WEF Gender Gap 2025 ranking is confirmed at 76th (+15); the exact score is estimated at 0.73–0.75 from trend data. All primary legislative and judicial documentation cited is drawn from Lawfare Media, the Center for Israel Education, the Times of Israel, and Freedom House, with at least two independent sources per finding.

**Scope boundary.** Gaza and the West Bank are not assessed in this report. Conditions in the occupied territories are examined separately by Freedom House and are explicitly excluded here. Any findings about Arab citizens of Israel refer to citizens within the Green Line only.

## 8.4 What This Report Is Not

This report is not investment advice, legal due diligence, or a ranking of Israel against other countries. It is not a political endorsement or criticism of any party, government, or foreign-policy position; not a statement on the conduct of the war in Gaza; not a prediction of specific governance events, including electoral outcomes; and not a substitute for expert country-specific analysis. It is a structured, indicator-based governance assessment applying a documented methodology to publicly available data.

APPENDIX

# Indicator Reference Table

| DIMENSION | PRIMARY INDICATOR | VALUE | SOURCE | YEAR | SECONDARY | VALUE | SOURCE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Constitutional Integrity** | Freedom House total | 73/100 | Freedom House | 2025, 2026 | V-Dem LDI | 0.588 (2025); electoral democracy | V-Dem |
| **Information Environment** | RSF Press Freedom | 46.46/100 | RSF | 2026 | Al Jazeera law; censorship directives | Active | Primary sources |
| **Institutional Signal Accuracy** | WJP Rule of Law | Not available | Israel not covered | — | WGI Rule of Law; V-Dem v2x_rule | 0.636 (2024); 0.889 (2025) | World Bank; V-Dem |
| **Institutional Constraint Architecture** | Judicial Selection Committee law | Passed — activates post-election | Knesset | Mar 2025 | Legal-adviser subordination bill | Advancing | Primary sources |
| **Public Service Delivery** | WGI Government Effectiveness | 1.26 (2023); 1.28 (2024) | World Bank | 2023, 2024 | War-driven impairment, multiple sectors | — | Taub Center |
| **Anti-Corruption** | CPI | 62/100 | TI | 2025 | Incapacitation law ruling | Tailor-made legislation confirmed | Supreme Court |
| **Minority and Civil Society** | FH Civil Liberties | 39/60 (2025 and 2026) | Freedom House | 2025 | Arab budget cut | $550M | J Street / Adalah |
| **Emergency Architecture** | State-of-emergency continuity | 78 years, no exception | Knesset records | 2026 | Feb 2026 Iran-strike emergency | Unilateral declaration | Times of Israel |
| **Democratic Feedback** | IDI institutional trust | Low across institutions | IDI | 2025 | October 7 commission | Blocked | Primary sources |
| **Institutional Shock Capacity** | Debt / GDP | 68.6% | IMF / Finance Ministry | 2025 | Fiscal deficit | 4.7% GDP | IMF Article IV |
| **Accountability and Reform** | WGI Rule of Law trend | 0.91 (2019) to 0.64 (2024) | World Bank | 2019–24 | October 7 commission status | Blocked by government | Primary sources |
| **Long-Run Sustainability** | WEF Gender Gap | ~0.73–0.75, rank 76 | WEF | 2025 | Ultra-Orthodox poverty | >50% of children below poverty line | IDI / Taub Center |

Institutional Signal Accuracy: primary indicator unavailable because Israel is not covered by the WJP Rule of Law Index (2023, 2024 and 2025 editions). Proxy used: WGI Rule of Law and V-Dem v2x_rule, both descriptive. Confidence: Low. No instrument band applies; the two proxies draw partly on shared expert informants and are not independent confirmation of each other.

ADDENDUM — OCTOBER 2026

# Before and After 7 October 2023

Working comparison, 8 October 2026 · Single analyst · Tags: F = fact from a primary or two-source check · C = contested · S = analyst reading

> **Direction: clear. Attribution to 7 October: not established.** Every independent rights, judiciary, information and voice indicator pulled for this comparison is lower now than in the vintage in force in September 2023. Election and corruption indicators are not. The annual data cannot separate the week of the attack from the year around it.

## Method

"Before" means the values published and in force on 30 September 2023: Freedom House 2023 edition, RSF 2023 edition, Transparency International CPI 2022, World Bank WGI 2022, V-Dem 2022. "Now" means the latest published: Freedom House 2026, RSF 2026, CPI 2025, WGI 2024 (2025 not yet released), V-Dem 2025. V-Dem is read from one edition (v16) for both points, because values drift between editions.

## Indicators at the two dates

| INDICATOR | BEFORE | NOW | CHANGE |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Freedom House total** | 77 (2023 ed.) | 73 (2026) | −4, all in civil liberties |
| **RSF press freedom** | 57.57, rank 97 (2023 ed.) | 46.46, rank 116 (2026) | −11.11 |
| **V-Dem Liberal Democracy** | 0.640 (2022) | 0.588 (2025) | −0.052 |
| V-Dem civil liberties | 0.847 | 0.787 | −0.060 |
| V-Dem judicial constraints | 0.920 | 0.857 | −0.063 |
| V-Dem rule of law | 0.942 | 0.889 | −0.053 |
| **WGI Voice and Accountability** | 0.610 (2022) | 0.448 (2024) | −0.162 |
| WGI Rule of Law | 0.775 | 0.636 | −0.139 |
| **V-Dem free and fair elections** | 0.875 | 0.873 | −0.002 (no change) |
| **TI Corruption Perceptions Index** | 62 or 63 (2022; sources conflict) | 62 (2025, rank 35) | about 0; 64 in 2024 |
| WGI Control of Corruption | 0.885 | 0.947 | +0.062 |
| V-Dem political corruption (higher = worse) | 0.105 | 0.107 | +0.002 |

Freedom House and RSF 2025 and 2026 values are from the organisations' own pages. RSF 2022–2024 and V-Dem are from the published data files. V-Dem 68% intervals overlap between 2022 and 2025 for every series checked (for example Liberal Democracy 0.580–0.695 in 2022 against 0.537–0.652 in 2025). The series are not independent: they draw on overlapping expert pools, and the World Bank indicators draw on several of the others. Read the table as one finding repeated, not as many confirmations.

## What is structurally different

| AREA | ABOUT 30 SEPTEMBER 2023 | OCTOBER 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| **Judicial review** | Reasonableness-limiting law passed July 2023; full 15-justice hearing set for 12 September 2023 | Struck down 8 to 7 on 1 January 2024. Judicial Selection Committee law passed 27 March 2025 (67 votes), takes effect with the next Knesset; 11-justice hearing 21 June 2026; no ruling found as of 27 July 2026 |
| **Attorney General** | In office | Government voted to dismiss her on 4 August 2025; High Court froze the decision within the hour; a seven-justice panel voided it unanimously in December 2025 |
| **Media** | No foreign-broadcaster closure law | Law passed April 2024 as temporary wartime legislation; extended 23 December 2025 (22 to 10) to 31 December 2027; court approval no longer required; can apply outside a state of emergency |
| **Emergency architecture** | State of emergency since 1948, renewed annually, no automatic sunset | Same, plus a second emergency declared 28 February 2026 |
| **Accountability for 7 October** | Not applicable | No state commission of inquiry. A coalition bill for a politically appointed commission passed first reading on 6 July 2026 (59 to 0, opposition boycotting) and did not pass its final readings before the Knesset dissolved on 17 July; the government plans to revive it after the election |
| **Elections** | Five elections April 2019 to November 2022, all results accepted | Knesset dissolved 17 July 2026; election 27 October 2026 |

Insufficient data: Israel Democracy Institute trust by institution before and after (published in charts only); any ruling on the Judicial Selection Committee law after 27 July 2026; whether the legal-adviser and civil-service bills of January 2026 survived the dissolution.

## How much of the fall predates the attack

- **V-Dem:** 2018 to 2022 was upward for Liberal Democracy, civil liberties, judicial constraints and rule of law. The break falls in the 2023 coding year, which holds the whole judicial overhaul fight and the attack together. Of the 2022–2025 fall, the 2023 coding year holds 77% for civil liberties, 57% for rule of law, 46% for Liberal Democracy, 41% for judicial constraints, 35% for free expression and 0% for legislative constraints.
- **RSF:** −2.05 in the last pre-attack edition, then −4.34, −2.18 and −4.60 in the three after. Faster after the attack, but the pre-attack window is one data point.
- **Freedom House:** three of the four points came in the 2024 edition, which covers 2023.
- **World Bank Political Stability** has fallen every year since 2018.

> **Reading (S).** The decline began with the 2023 overhaul and its protests. The attack and the war added to it, and then supplied the legal route for some measures: the foreign-broadcaster law was passed as temporary wartime legislation in April 2024. A clean split between the two is not possible with annual data.

## The framework read, applied backwards

| | SEPTEMBER 2023 VINTAGE | NOW |
|---|---|---|
| HG-1, Freedom House below 70 | 77, clear | 73, clear by three points |
| HG-2, CPI below 40 | clear | 62, clear |
| HG-3, no automatic emergency sunset | **active** | **active** |
| HG-4, RSF below 50 | 57.57, clear | **46.46, active** |
| **Hard gates active** | **1 of 4** | **2 of 4** |

The September 2023 column is the analyst's retrospective application of the instrument's thresholds (S), not a published finding. The press-freedom gate crossed only with the 2026 RSF edition. Constitutional Integrity was in the Warning band at both dates (Freedom House 77 and 73), so the Healthy label in the first edition of this report was never supported by the numbers, and the correction does not reflect a change after the attack.

## What can and cannot be said

**Can be said (F).** Israel's measured institutional environment is lower on rights, judicial constraint, rule of law, information and voice than it was a week before 7 October 2023, by modest amounts (Freedom House −4 of 100; V-Dem Liberal Democracy −0.05). Elections and corruption indicators are not lower.

**Can be said (S).** The period since has added structural changes to the rules around the checks. It has not removed a check.

**Cannot be said.** That 7 October caused the decline. The overhaul fight was already moving the series, and annual data cannot isolate a week.

**Not tested.** A dated, within-year comparison. It would need event-level data, such as protest or detention counts or RSF's monthly barometer, which was not pulled for this note.

**Sources.** Freedom House, Israel country pages 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026; RSF country page and index files 2022–2025; Transparency International, Israel; World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators; V-Dem Country-Year Core v16; Jurist (1 January 2024 ruling); Media Line and Bloomberg (Attorney General); Times of Israel, Jerusalem Post and RTHK (commission bill, Judicial Selection Committee hearings, Knesset dissolution); Times of Israel and The New Arab (foreign-broadcaster law); Israel Democracy Institute.

Country–Organism Governance Atlas · An independent project by Nevo Goor · July 2026
Stage 0 — internally calibrated, externally unvalidated · Structured analytical opinion · Not legal, investment, or political advice
US and Brazil diagnostic reports also available at nevogoor.substack.com

**Revision note, October 2026.** The first edition rated Constitutional Integrity as Healthy on a Freedom House score of 85. Freedom House gives Israel 73 out of 100, so the dimension is now Constrained. Estimated values were replaced with published ones (RSF 2026: 46.46; CPI 2025: 62), the World Justice Project figure was removed because that index does not cover Israel, and the election count was corrected to five. The addendum on 7 October 2023 is new. The two hard-gate findings do not change.